Resolved: The United States Federal Government should ban the collection of personal data through biometric recognition technology.

Why "collection" is the radical word

The resolution bans collection, not just misuse, and Pro should own that radicalism rather than soften it. Biometric data is different in kind from other data. It can’t be changed (a leaked face can’t be reissued like a credit card), it can be collected at a distance without consent, and it’s the key that links every other dataset to a physical body. Pro argues use restrictions fail because the databases are the harm: every collection is a breach, and a tool for authoritarians, waiting to happen. Only banning collection itself removes the risk.

The infrastructure Con defends

Con’s ground is everything biometrics quietly runs: phone unlocking, identity checks at airports, fraud prevention in banking, patient matching in hospitals, and an investigative tool that has cleared cold cases and identified victims. A federal ban on collection sweeps up consented, on-device, privacy-preserving uses along with surveillance abuses, which throws out the technology along with its misuse. Con pairs this with displacement. Demand for identity verification doesn’t go away; it moves to passwords and documents that are less secure and easier to steal.

Regulation versus prohibition

The real clash is over the remedy. Does the harm require a ban, or can a consent-and-audit regime keep the benefits while policing the abuses? Pro’s answer to regulation is enforcement realism: biometric collection is invisible, so violations go undetected, and consent is fictional when your face gets scanned walking down the street. Con’s answer to prohibition is precision. State biometric privacy laws with private rights of action have already changed corporate behavior, which shows the targeted tool works. Whoever wins whether regulation can be enforced usually wins the round.